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Applying  Western  textbook  solutions  to the problems  of enter-
prise  reform  in Eastern  Europe  is likely  to be counterproductive.
Policy  design  must  be imaginative  and  explicitly  incorporate  the
political constraints and incentive problems specific to the
region, leading to rew approaches  to enterprise and banking
reform.
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This paper  - a product  of the Europe and Central Asia Department  - is part of a larger effort in the
department  to assist the process of enterprise  reform  in Eastern  Europe.  Parts of this paper draw on van
Wijnbergen  (1992), which appeared in the 1992 Marjolin essay competition volume sponsored by
American  Express  Bank.  Copies  of this  paper  are available  free  from the World  Bank, 1818  H Street  NW,
Washington,  DC 20433.  Please  contact  Bonnie  Pacheco,  room  H1  1-071,  extension  37033  (January  1993,
36 pages).
Enterprise  reform  is emerging  as the core  created  by diffuse ownership  and conflicts  over
economic  problem  in Eastern  Europe.  As privat-  control  that exist before  privatization.  Regular
ization  has been  delayed,  a new problem  has  cash auctions  may fail to match managers  and
emerged,  largely  unanticipated  by outside  capital  stock efficiently  because  of pervasive
advisers:  It is probably  possible  to run a clear-cut  wealth  constraints.  Standard  advice  on enterprise
state enterprise  efficiently,  and it is certainly  restructuring  does not allow  for the sheer scale of
possible to get efficient  perfonnance  from a  the  problem  or the special  reasons why,  in
private  enterprise.  But it is utterly impossible  to  Eastern  Europe,  current  profits are a poor guide
get anything  like efficiency  from an enterprise  to potential  profitability.  Simply applying
for which the current  and future  ownership  status  Westem  bankruptcy  procedures  based on current
are in limbo. What  has happened  in Poland,  data about  enterprise  profitability  introduces  a
where reform  started  earlier  than elsewhere,  is  destructive  bias toward liquidation  and delay.
probably  a harbinger  of things to come.
And, argues van Wijnbergen,  introducing
Two years after  the crumbling  of central  Western  style  unemployment  insurance,  al-
authority  that used to exercise  both ownership  though it would lower the social costs of unem-
and control,  ownership  of ntnte-owned  enter-  ployment,  could also contribute  to its indefinite
prises remains  ineffective  and control  diffuse.  extension.
Lacking  sharply  defined  control  rights, various
groups  (workers,  incumbent  managers,  and local  Van Wijnbergen  sketches  how these prob-
authorities)  often  had no other way of demon-  lems  can be addressed  by incorporating  all the
strating  their clout than  by disrupting  the enter-  incentive  problems  specific  to Eastem Europe
prise. And with changes  in ownership  announced  into  the design of the policies to be implemented.
but not implemented,  managers  and workers  Sometimes  the advice  that results is novel and as
councils  alike have every  incentive  to  yet untried; sometimes  examples  exist of its
decapitalize  the enterprise  and increase  its debts.  successful  implementation.  But the altemative  is
a long period  of declining  incomes  and, presum-
Eastern  Europe  is not well served with  ably,  increasing  social  unrest as the consensus
straight  textbook  advice.  The common  wisdom  underlying  the reform  programs  begins to erode.
on privatizadtion  fails  to address  the  problems
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I  INTRODUCTION
Price  decontrol  has eliminated  queues  in Eastern  Europe  within  a  matter
of weeks.  What it has  not done is lead  the  place  much closer  to efficient
resource  use.  Moreover,  the  reforms  that  most economists  agree  are  necessary
to introduce  production  side  efficiency  have been surprizingly  difficult  to
introduce.  Privatization  drives,  after  init.al  successes  in  selling  off shops,
restaurants  and  so on,  have stalled,  with  none of the grandiose  distribution
schemes  anywhere  near implementation  (Czecho-Slovakia's  voucher  experiment  may
provide  the  first  exception  after  almost  two  years  of delays).  In the  mean
time,  output  in State  Owned  Enterprises  (SOEs)  has collapsed  across  the  beard,
almost  independent  of sectors  and  country  of location.  As a consequence,  even
the  success  stories  Czecho-Slovakia  and  Hungary  have seen  GDP decline  by
double  digit  numbers  in the  first  year central  planning  was abandoned.
The  collapse  of the SOE  sector  all  over Eastern  Europe  has also
dramatically  increased  the  difficulty  of  macroeconomic  management.  Governments
relied  mostly  on SOE  profits  as a source  of revenue;  with the  decline  of SOE
profitability  the tax  base is  rapidly  eroding.  Since  introduction  of  efficient
systems  of taxation  is turning  out  to be more time  consuming  than  many
thought,  governments  now face  the  difficult  choice  between  cutting  expenditure
in line  with falling  taxes,  the  deepening  recession  notwithstanding,  or
reignite  inflation  through  increasing  reliance  on the  inflation  tax.  Moreover
the  widespread  fear of massive  unemployment  once privatization  proceeds  in
earnest  is  developing  as a major  deterrent  to privatization.  This problem  is
more acute  in a recession  because  fired  workers  would  have  difficulty  finding
alternative  employment  while  the  economy  is already  in a slump.2
Thus enterprise  reform  is emerging  as the  core  economic  problem  in
Eastern  Europe.  Moreover,  as implementation  of the  privatization  plans ran
into  delays,  a  new problem  emerged,  largely  unanticipated  by outside  advisers.
It is  probably  possible  to run  a clear  cut  state  enterprise  efficiently,  and
it is certainly  possible  to get  efficient  performance  from a  private
enterprise.  What is turning  out to  be utterly  impossible  is to get  anything
like  efficien:y  from  an enterprise  whose  current  and future  ownership  status
are in limbo.  The Polish  example  is iikely  to prove  a harbinger  of things  to
come  elsewhere,  as Poland's  reform  program  started  earlier  than  those  in the
rest  of Central  Europe  and the  CIS  states.
Two  years  after  the  crumbling  of central  authority  that  used to exercise
both ownership  and  control,  ownership  of SOEs  remains  ineffective  and control
diffuse.  In the  absence  of sharply  defined  control  rights,  various  groups
(workers,  incumbent  managers,  local  authorities)  often  had no other  way of
demonstrating  their  clout  than  disrupting  the  enterprise.  Moreover,  with
changes  in ownership  announced  but not implemented,  managers  and  workers
councils  alike  have every  incentive  to decapitalise  the  enterprise  and
increase  its  debts.  Thus  wage claims  have accelerated  well beyond  productivity
increases,  and two  years  after  hyperinflation  wiped  out all  nominal  debts,
2000 out  of Poland's  8000  major  enterprises  yet to  be privatized  find
themselves  once again  unable  to service  their  rapidly  accumulating  debts.
There is little  doubt  that  this  number  would  grow if interest  capitalization
on bank debt would  stop.
The debt  overhang  problem  that  has  been created  in the  past two  years
pretty  much prevents  straight  privatization  through  auctioning.  Outsiders  have
no way of knowing  whether  the  firm's  distress  situation  is due  to inefficient3
management,  due to  very efficient  management  responding  to perverse  incentives
or due  to the  fact that  the  firm  has no prospects  at its  current  capital
structure  even  under  the  best of  management  practices.  This  means that
enterprise  restructuring  has  become  unavoidable  in spite  of widespread
agreement  in the  profession  that  this is  best left  to new  private  owners.
An additional  problem  concerns  the  financial  sector's  role in all  this.
Western  loan  classification  practices  would  show  most of the  banks recently
split  off from the  central  bank to  be insolvent,  in  most cases  because  of the
very  debt servicing  problems  in the  SOE sector  I just  highlighted.  But  banks
are  the  major  creditors  of SOEs  and  claims  on SOEs  dominate  the  asset
portfolios  of the  banks.  These  two  facts  make separate  treatment  of enterprise
debt  and  bank recapitalization  impossible.  Thus a successful  restructuring
plan  needs to address  both problems  jointly.  The  current  note identifies  the
main outstanding  issues  and  proposes  ways of addressing  them  within  the
general  framework  and  the  current  legal  structure  concerning  privatization  and
debt  restructuring  in  Eastern  Europe.
II  OBJECTIVES  OF  A SOUND  RESTRUCTURING  PLAN
The core  objective  is to restore  efficient  employment  of industrial
assets,  both capital  and  labor.  The  more  narrow  objective  of solving  the  debt
overhang  of enterprises  and the  portfolio  quality  problem  in  banks  is a
prerequisite  for the  wider  objective.  However,  common  sense  and  experience
elsewhere  (for  example  Morocco's  public  enterprise  restructuring  in 1987)
suggest  that that  is not  enough.  The  debt problems  arose  for  a reason;  if that
root  cause  is not addressed,  the  problems  will  most likely  reoccur  a few  years4
from  now,  as they  did in  Morocco.  Thus  any sound  restructuring  plan  will  have
to include  safeguards  against  reoccurrence.
Experience  to date in Eastern  Europe  has shown  clearly  that it is  maybe
possible  to  run  a clear-cut  state  enterprise  efficiently  and that  it is
certainly  possible  for  a private  enterprise  to function  efficiently.  What is
clearly  not  possible  is, to  run an enterprise  efficiently  whose  ownership  and
control  structure  are in limbo.  Thus a clarification  of  medium  term ownership
structure  should  be the  starting  point  of any  plan.  Similarly,  clear
assignment  of control  rights  over the  corporation,  not in the  medium  term  but
right  now, is  essential  to stop  the  destructive  fights  over control  and the
decapitalization  that  are  currently  plaguing-most  enterprises.
The first  deci3ion  necessary  to achieve  clarification  of  ownership
status  is whether  the  firm is to  be privatized  or even  in the  long  run should
remain  in state  hands.  If state,  the  company  should  arguably  be transferred  to
a separate  agency  that  will deal  with enterprises  that  are  to remain  in  state
ownership;'/  the  state  as senior  creditor  and  owner  can take  separate  action
and afterwards  establish  an effective  governance  scheme.  Incentive  problems  in
permanent  state  enterprises  are  entirely  different  from  those  faced  in
enterprises  about  to  be privatized;  there  is no obvious  merit  in combining
their  control  in  one  agency.
For those  enterprises  that  are  not to remain  in the  state  sector,
reestablishing  central  control  on an interim  basis is  unlikely  to  be
effective.  No governance  scheme  can  be effective  if privatization  will take
place  "somewhere"  in the  future,  since  managers  in that  case  always  have
1  See  Dervis  and Condon  (1992)  for  a defense  of this  approach,  which  was
followed  in  Hungary.5
incentives  to decapitalise  the  firm  and  buy off  worker  unrest  through
excessive  wage increases.  This suggests  that  all  firms  not  permanently  put
under  state  ownership  should  be transformed  into  joint-stock  companies
immediately,  with the  intention  to transfer  these  stocks  to an effective  owner
in the  near future.  The only  proper  safeguard  against  reoccurrence  of the  debt
problems  is  a substantial  acceleration  of the  privatization  effort.
For  firms  that  currently  succeed  in  servicing  their  debts,  one of the
many  proposed  privatization  schemes  can  be considered;  a  positive  cash flow
after  debt service  means that  a positive  price  is feasible  through  auction  or
possibly  bilateral  negotiation.  Such  a sale  does  not  necessarily  have to
involve  cash  up front;  a strong  case  can  be made to also  seriously  consider
non-cash  mechanisms,  such  as bank funded  management  buy outs.  Otherwise  wealth
constraints  might  limit  the  set  of potential  bidders  too  much,  leaving  out
potentially  better  entrepreneurs  because  of ineffective  capital  markets.
However  auctioning  off enterprises  with a  heavy  debt  burden  will most
likely  fail;  under  present  management  practice  most of them  are insolvent,
which  precludes  straight  auctioning  off  since  a cash auction,  for  incentive
reasons,  will require  a positive  price. To see this,  note what  the  effect  of
a  negative  price  at a cash  auction  would  be: a transfer  to a "buyer"  of a lump
sum  payment  plus  a negative  net  worth  company  (otherwise  the  cash  payment
would  not  be necessary  to  begin  with).  Clearly  the  optimal  thing  to do for the
buyer is to simply  take the  money  and  walk away from  the  company;  this  would,
with the  state  or state  owned  banks  being  the  main creditors,  once  again  mean
state  ownership.  The  net result  would  then  be a cash transfer  but  no
privatization.
Problems  with  auctions  are  exacerbated  if  many firms  are  offered  at the6
same  time.  In that  case the information  problem  for  potential  bidders  becomes
almost  impossible  to solve.  However,  the  problems  with negative  price  cash
auctions  do not  mean tha.  heavily  indebted  firms  should  not  be privatized,  but
that  their  debts  need to  be reduced  prior  to privatization.
Liquidation,  which is often  proposed  for  enterprises  that  do not
generate  enough  cash  flow to service  their  debts,  is  both infeasible  in
practice  and  likely  to be excessively  destructive;  poor performance  in many
cases  reflects  as much distorted  management  incentives  as real insolvency
assuming  sensible  management  incentives.  A much  more efficient  way of debt
restructuring  would  use the  opportunity  to introduce  effective  ownership  into
the  process.  This  suggests  that  conversion  of some  of the  debt into  equity
should  be the  main focal  point  of the  restructuring  exercise,  rather  than  debt
write  downs  and full  collection  of what  remains.  Debt equity  conversion  offers
a  more  promising  way towards  efficient  use of the  assets  controlled  by the
enterprises  than liquidation  into  a thin  capital  market  and a depressed
economy  does.
Privatization  is in fact  most efficiently  done  within  the context  of the
debt  restructuring  plan.  After  all, debt  restructuring  and  work outs  will
involve  changes  in the  modus  operandi  of the firm;  to  make such  decisions
without  involving  the  ultimate  owners  is likely  to  be inefficient  in  that it
almost  guarantees  the  need for  further  reorganizations  once  new  owners  take
over.  Thus there  is a high  priority  to  devising  ways of bringing  privatization
into  any  debt restructuring  scheme.
The situation  is different  for  commercial  banks.  While there  is little
doubt  that  they  need to  be privatized  eventually  if they  are  to operate
efficiently,  the  combination  of de facto  if not  de jure deposit  insurance  and7
information  asymmetries  makes this  industry  exceptionally  vulnerable  to fraud.
There  is  now  widespread  consensus  in the  economics  profession  that  the  fastest
way towards  a socialized  banking  system  is complete  liberalization  without
effective  regulation.  Chile's  banking  collapse  in 1982  after  a no holds  barred
liberalization  effort  is  only the  best  known  of  many such  crises.  On these
grounds,  actual  privatization  of the  commercial  banks  may  be best delayed
until  an effective  regulation  framework  and  mechanisms  for  enforcement  of
prudential  rules  are in place.
This also  means  that  working  towards  establishing  such  mechanisms  is of
the  utmost  importance;  a really  efficient  banking  system  cannot  be expected  to
come in operation  until  that  time.  In the  mean time,  half  way solutions  can  be
implemented,  following  the  Mexican  example  in financial  sector  reform:  run the
banks,  while still  state  owned,  on an "arm's  length"  basis  until  regulation  is
in  place,  at which  time  they  can  be privatized.  This  makes the  provision  of
proper  incentives  to  bank  managers  a  particularly  thorny  problem.  Since  much
of  what will  be proposed  below  hinges  critically  on the  banks  exercising
effective  control  over their  onsets,  such  reforms  are  also  critical  for the
success  of the  enterprise  reforms.
III  PRIVATIZING  PROFITABLE  INDUSTRIES
There  is  widespread  agreement  that  privatization  is the  ultimate  answer
to Eastern  Europe's  problems,  and that  it should  be done fast.  Nevertheless
not  a single  country  has been  able to implement  privatization  at a significant
scale  beyond  simple  single  establishment  service  sector  firms.  Everywhere  mass
privatization  schemes  have either  been abandoned  or are  stalled;  even  Czecho-8
Slovakia's  vouchers  scheme  has  been delayed  by almost  two  years.  So what is it
that  the initial  advice  overlooked?  Why is  privatization  so much more
difficult  than initially  thought?
The initial  discussions  focused  mostly  on  how to  promote  widespread
share  ownership  without  diluting  corporate  control  and  on whether  the
government  should  also  pursue  revenue  objectives  (Tirole  (1991)).  For  small
establishments  there  is only  one owner  so the  effective  control  issue  does  not
arise.  In most  mass  privatlzation  schemes  the  effective  control  objective  is
pursued  through  establishment  of intermediaries  (investment  funds).  The
monitoring  of the  funds  themselves  is an unresolved  issue.  Since  most of the
private  sector  emerged  from  communism  completely  decapitalized,  Mexican  or  UK
style  auctioning  would  have  been impossible;  a serious  stock-flow  problem
(financing  the  purchase  of the  capital  stock  out  of the flow  of current
savings)  precludes  prices  anywhere  near discounted  future  earnings.  Thus both
Poland  and  Czecho-Slovakia  settled  for  give away  schemes  at nominal  fees.
Exceptions  were  made  where  dominant  investors  could  be found,  usually
foreigners;  in that  case firms  were to  be kept  out of the  mass  privatization
schemes.
All this  sounds  well thought  through  and  workable;  so  why has n't it
worked?  With  hindsight  three  major  issues  were overlooked,  each important
enough  in itself  to  block  serious  progress.  The first  issue  derives  from  the
most  striking  difference  between  SOEs  in Eastern  Europe  and say  Mexico  and  the
UK: in the  latter  two  countries  state  enterprises,  by the  time  privatization
came  under consideration,  were tightly  controlled  by an effective  central
authority.  The situation  was the  same  in Eastern  Europe  until the  early
eighties;  but it  was this  very  central  authority  that  was completely9
discredited  during  the  collapse  of  communism  towards  the  end  of  the  decade.
Since  then  control  of  SOEs  has  been  diffuse,  with  several  groups  vying  for  a
dominant  position:  workers,  incumbent  managers  and  local  governments. 2 This
situation  has  led  one  observer  to  call  for  nationalization  as  a  prerequisite
for  privatization  (Hinds  (1992)).  The  battle  for  enterprize  control  has  not
only  crippled  the  current  operations  of  SOEs  throughout  Eastern  Europe,  but
has  also  effectively  precluded  privatization.  With  nobody  exercising  effective
control,  nobody  can  transfer  it  either.
Hinds'  suggestion  to  start  with  reestablishing  central  control  is
understandable  but  clearly  not  a solution:  if  central  authorities  would  have
been  able  to  implement  such  a  solution,  they  would  not  have  lost  control  in
the  first  place.  The  proper  response  probably  requires  buying  off  those  groups
powerful  enough  to  block  privatization  in  the  absence  of  such  measures.  This
could  be  done  by  transfer  of  shares  as  part  of  the  privatization  process.
Elements  of  such  transfers  have  been  built  in  the  process  in  Poland,  but
apparently  not  enough  and  not  well  enough  targeted.  There  are  clear  political
problems  with  this  advice;  in  most  cases  the  former  power  brokers  (the
"Nomenklatura")  are  among  the  groups  to  be  bought  off.  The  experience  so  far
suggests  however  that  the  costs  of  locking  them  out,  even  if  ultimately
successful,  something  that  seems  anyhow  increasingly  unlikely,  would  be
prohibitive  and  in  the  end  would  leave  everybody  worse  off.
The  second  problem  stems  from  the  employment  effects  of  privatization.
Experience  so  far  suggests  that  privatization  leads  to  layoffs  of  about  50%  of
the  work  force  prior  to  privatization.  This  would  obviously  cause  dramatic
2  Schleifer  and  Vishny  (1992)  give  a  vivid  account  of  this  process  in
Russia.10
problems  if privatization  would take  place  rapidly  and on a massive  scale  and
explains  why workers  everywhere  have resisted  privatization  fiercely  (this  is
especially  clear  in Poland).  Western  advice  to deal  with this  problem  through
European  style  safety  net institutions  is  obviously  not going  to  resolve  this
problem:  to leave  workers  anywhere  near  their  previous  level  of income  would
lead  to totally  unaffordable  schemes  which  in addition  would  completely
destroy  adjustment  and labor  supply  incentives.  We return  to this issue  in
section  VI.
The third  problem  is  more practical  than the  previous  two, although
probably  as important.  The administrative  requirements  of the  various  schemes
have clearly  been underestimated  and  are far  out of line  with most East
European  governments'  administrative  capacity.  One solution  is to  focus  a
great  deal  of foreign  technical  assistance  on the  privatization  agency.  A more
fundamental  approach  is to design  the  program  in such  a way that  most of the
initiative  lies  outside  the  government  sector,  bypassing  its  agencies  to the
extent  possible.  The countries  where  privatization  does seem  to be progressing
most rapidly  all  put  most of the  initiative  with the  enterprises  or the  banks,
not  with government  agencies  (Czecho-Slovakia  or Croatia  are examples).
IV  ENTERPRISE  RESTRUCTURING  AND  PRIVATIZATION
Straight  privatizatiorn  is  not going  to succeed  for those  enterprises  who
do not  generate  enough  cash  flow  to service  their  current  debt and  leave  some
income  for residual  claimants.  Those  firms  may  however  be salvageable  at lower
levels  of debt;  they  are thus  candidates  for  restructuring.  This section
attempts  to apply  the  general  principals  laid  out so far  to the  design  of a11
restructuring-cum-privatization  program  for enterprises.  The first  section
states  key guiding  principles  and  the  second  sketches  two  proposals  that
adhere  to these  guidelines.
IV.1  Core Issues  in Debt  Restructuring
A  Avoid  Large  Scale  Liquidation 3/
The idea  that  almost  an entire  industrial  sector  would  be unsalvageable
makes  very little  sense.  After  all  a large  part of GDP (which  is a value  added
concept!)  is produced  in  manufacturing;  this  means  per definition  that it is
possible  to devise  a capital  structure  and  set  of wage contracts  under  which
most of the  sector  can  operate  profitably.  Moreover,  it is  more than likely
that  most of the  problems  are  related  to distorted  incentive  structures  in the
past rather  than incompetent  management;  and  even in the  latter  case the  right
solution  would  be to replace  management,  not  necessarily  to  break  up the  firm.
It is true  that  in  most of Eastern  Europe  firms  are excessively
vertically  integrated,  as this  was often  the  only  way secure  input  supplies
could  be arranged  under  central  planning.  But chis  problem  calls  for  splitting
the  firm into  smaller  firms  during  privatization 4, not for  asset  stripping,
which is  what liquidation  amounts  to.
3  Liquidation  means  piece-meal  selling  off  of the  firm's  assets.  In
Poland,  somewhat  confusingly,  wholesale  leasing  out  of all the  firm's  assets,
often  to incumbent  managers  for  operation  in a private  shadow  company  often  on
the same  premises,  is also  called  liquidation.  Such  a  process  is  better  looked
at as a  particular  form  of a non-cash  management  buy  out, a class  of
privatization  devices  that  has  much to recommend  itself.
4 Or even  afterwards,  by the  new owners,  if  no monopoly  problems  are
created  by not doing  it  during  privatization.12
B  Avold If  posslble  formal  bankruptcy  procedures;
Use of bankruptcy  procedures  would inevitably  overload  the system  and
lead to interminable  legal  delays,  thus  prolonging  the  very limbo  on ownership
and  effective  control  that  is  behind  much of the  current  SOE crisis  to  begin
with.  This requires  more than  just a decision  not to use  bankruptcy  courts  in
the  workout  scheme.  In particular,  the  next point  needs  to be resolved  if
excessive  use of  bankruptcy  courts  is to be avoided.
C  Resolve  conflicts  between  credltors  without  triggering  unnecessary
liquLdation;
Any debt  work  out  has to find  a way to reconcile  different  creditor
interests.  In particular  if  a senior  creditor  imposes  a solution  seen to  be
unfair  or less  favorable  than  straight  liquidation  by another  creditor,  that
other  creditor  will derail  the  program  by triggering  bankruptcy  procedures.
This is a major  issue,  since  the  bankruptcy  courts  clearly  cannot  handle  say
2000  companies  within  6  months.  Thus the  work  out scheme  needs  to incorporate
mechanisms  of resolving  creditor  conflicts  that  will  not trigger  excessive
liquidation  proceed1i.,s.5
5  This is one  of the  objections  against  the  Begg-Portes  (1992)  proposal
to take  loans  to loss  making  SOEs  off  the  banks'  books  and  put them  back in
the  Government  to auction  them  off to  whomever  wishes  to  collect  on them.
Their  proposal  pays no attention  to the  creditor  conflict  issue  at all and
thus  is likely  to lead  to inaction  and  delays  on enterprise  restructuring.
Another  reason  to expect  that  is that in their  proposal  the initiative  for
enterprise  restructuring  is  again  put  back  with the  Government  in a
centralized  approach.  But of course  most  governments  have  already  demonstrated
that they  cannot  really  come to grips  with these  problems.13
D  Malntaln  lncentives  to ao_  unload  debt to the  government;
Debt  write-offs  should  be just enough  to  restore  solvency,  but  not  more
than  that.  In particular  excessive  unloading  of bank and interenterprise  debt
onto  the  government  will add  to an already  extremely  difficult  macro-
management  problem.  Servicing  the  debt so created  would  require  additional  tax
measures  while  the  current  system  is already  strained  to the  limits  to finance
current  expenditure  plans  in a non-inflationary  manner.  Thus debt
restructuring  should  be costly  to management  and  commercial  banks.
E  Bias  Debt  RestructurLng  towards  Debt/Equity  ConversLon;
This  has  been a trend  in bankruptcy  reform  all  over the  Western  world.
D/E  conversion  allows  the  firm  to continue  as a going  concern  and avoids  the
firesale  problems  associated  with liquidation.  A creditor  is  always  better  off
with a D/E  conversion  than  if it  writes  the  loans  off;  equity  cannot  fall
below  zero so is at worst  equivalent  to  a write  off,  but if the  firm's
fortunes  improve,  the  creditor  will share  in  the  upswing.  It  will also
simplify  turning  the  debt  restructuring  into  a privatization  device.
F  Reserve  a Substantial  Role  for the  Commercial  Banks  In the  Process;
It is  arguable  that  having  the  government  or  one of its  agencies  as the
"agent  of change"  in  privatization  or restructuring  will lead  to considerable
delays.  It is  very difficult,  if  not impossible,  to structure  incentives  in
such  a  way that  middle  level  officials,  who  will actually  have to implement14
any  scheme,  find it in their  interest  to cooperate.  It is possible  (and  very
important!)  to provide  such incentives  to  bank  managers  (cf  Section  V.3).
An additional  argument  to rely  on banks  as the  "agents  of change"  is
that  through  their  existing  customer  relation  they  are  best placed  to  judge
the  potential  of a firm  and thus  the  merits  of a  particular  restructuring
plan.  The  objection  that banks  do not  have the  skills  to  do this  right,  even
if true,  is less  compelling  than it seems  at first  sight.  The  point is  not
that  banks  are  good at doing  this,  but that they  are likely  to  be better  than
anybody  else,  in  particular  better  than  the  government.
Concentrating  substantial  ownership  of equity  in the  commercial  banks
causes  regulatory  problems;  in particular  it is difficult  to evaluate  the
equity  for  capital  adequacy  calculations,  since  it is likely  to remain  non-
traded  in  most cases.  This means  that  over time  equity  in  bank portfolios  may
have to  be sold  off,  which  could  be done through  providing  only temporary
wavers  from  exposure  limits.  However  converting  much bank debt into  equity
creates  concentrated  share  ownership  which  has one  big plus point:  at least
one  group  of shareholders  has the  ability  and  incentives  to actively  monitor
managers.  The  regulatory  problem  is likely  to  be minor  for some  time if  banks
are  recapitalized  up front  on the  basis  of a conservative  assessment  of the
status  of the  loan  that is to be converted  into  equity.  And as time  goes  by
and  the  regulatory  problem  grows,  the  banks  can  be made to sell  off the  equity
gradually.  To avoid  the firesale  problems  associated  with instantaneous
liquidation,  a substantial  time  period  should  be allowed  for this,  in the
order  of say  five  years.
IV.2  Two  Practical  Proposals15
In  what follows  I outline  two  proposals  for  restructuring;  both
ultimately  aim  at debt-to-equity  conversion,  but each takes  a different
approach  to the  problems  created  by the  existence  of multiple  creditors  with
different  seniority.  Typically,  creditors  can  be subdivided  in three  classes:
one,  and  most senior,  the  government  through  tax  arrears,  social  security
claims  and so on.  Two,  bank credit  and secured  non-bank  creditors;  three,
interenterprise  credits.  At the  bottom  of all this  are the  ultimate  owners,  in
this  case the  government  or a government-run  agency.  The two  proposals  diftw'r
in their  approach  to resolving  creditor  conflicts.  But  both aim  at
privatization  of the  restructured  enterprise,  and  both rely  heavily  on the
commercial  banks to  resolve  the  administrative  capacity  constraints  on
privatization  agencies.  Both also  explicitly  allow  for  non-cash  bids,  an
important  feature  in the  presence  of pervasive  wealth  constraints  and
imperfect  capital  markets (without  which  wealth  constraints  would  be a non-
issue).
A  An Unfamiliar  but  Almost  Perfect  Approach:  Taking  a Cue  from  Recent
Proposals  for  Bankruptcy  Reform
Bankruptcy  reform  throughout  the  Western  world  has attempted  to remove
the  liquidation  bias from  regular  bankruptcy  proceedings.  In  most cases,
firms,  once  properly  managed,  will be worth  much  more than the  resale  value  of
their  underlying  ir.dividual  assets.  Thus  there  is  an incentive  to  maintain  the
firm  as a going  concern,  or at least  maintain  potentially  successful
subdivisions  as going  concerns.  The approach  sketched  below  modifies  a recent
proposal  for  bankruptcy  reform  so as to turn  it into  a method  for16
restructuring-cum-privatization  (cf  Aghion,  Hart  and  Moore (1992).
The  proposal  is designed  to reach  three  objectives:
-A  Achieve  fast  clarification  of ownership  and control  through
privatization;
-B  Provide  a mechanism  for  resolving  creditor  conflicts  during  the  debt
work out;
-C  Do all this  as part of the  debt  restructuring  scheme.
The latter  is important  to avoid  destructive  outcomes  of the  work out  scheme.
The  proposal  consists  of two  parts,  a way of soliciting  reorganization
proposals  and  a method  of debt  and  capital  restructuring.  The  method  of debt
restructuring  is  best explained  by example.  Take the  case  of two  creditors:
for  example  tax  arrears  and  a commercial  bank,  say  of 100  $  and  200  $  each
respectively  (a  structurally  similar  approach  should  be followed  in the  case
of more than  two  classes  of creditors).  The debt  restructuring  scheme  implies
four  steps,  to be implemented  simultaneously:
1  A complete  write-off  of all  debts;
2  Creation  of equity  (in  this  case  100  shares  of 1$)  all of  which  goes to
the senior  creditor.  i..e.  in this  case the  government.
3  The  Junior  creditor  receives  a  call option  on those  shares  with exercise
price  of $1 per share.  The  bank will  exercise  this option  if the  value
of the  firm  without  any  debt  exceeds  the  value  of the  government's
claims  (which  the  government  anyhow  could  scale  back if it so  wishes).
4  Managers  and  workers  receive  call options  with exercise  price  of $3  per17
share,  which  means  exercising  them  will allow  all  senior  creditors  to  be
paid off,  Alternatively,  such  residual  claims  could  be auctioned  off.
Simultaneously  with the  debt  restructuring,  the  administrator  of the
overall  scheme  should  sollicit  reorganization  proposals,  either  from  any  of
the  creditors,  from  workers  and/or  incumbent  management,  or from  outside
investors.  The  main creditor  bank should  play a  major  role  at this  stage  and
could  expedite  the  process  by threatening  to invoke  foreclosure  on
collateralized  assets  if  workers  and  management  refuse  to cooperate.  The
eventual  shareholder  emerging  from the  debt restructuring  process  can  vote to
accept  any of the  proposals  for  reorganization  or reject  them  all, in  which
case  liquidation  becomes  unavoidable.
Viable  reorganization  proposals  could  come  from  foreigners  or outside
domestic  investors,  with cash injection;  or from  incumbent  management  without
cash injection.  In fact  this  procedure  allows  for  non-cash-management-buy-
outs:  commercial  banks  could,  instead  of exercising  their  own  options,  finance
management's  exercising  the  lower  level  options  it  receives  under  this  scheme.
This  particular  implementation  solves  a series  of outstanding  problems.
First  of all, seniority  of claims  is  preserved,  which  facilitates  the  actual
reaching  of an agreement;  no junior  creditor  will  have an incentive  at any
stage  to derail  the  whole  procedure  by triggering  formal  bankruptcy
proceedings.  And senior  creditors  will  either  get  paid,  become  owners  or can
install  owners  of their  liking.  Wholesale  commercialization  (conversion  of
enterprises  in  joint-stock  companies)  becomes  possible  within  the  context  of
the  current  privatization  laws,  which  typically  transfer  ownership  of newly
created  shares  to a government  agency.  Without  a procedure  like  the  one18
proposed  here with the  various  layers  of call  options,  such laws  preclude  debt
equity  conversion  of loans  held  by commercial  banks.  This in turn  means that
D/E conversion  of bank claims  can  be implemented  without  the  need to go  back
to  parliament  with all the  associated  delays.  Furthermore  the  scLleme  creates  a
class  of equity  holders  seriously  interested  in  proper  management  of the
companies;  and  arguably  most importantly,  it  provides  a straightforward  way of
using  debt  restructuring  to accelerate  privatization.
Finally,  the  scheme  readily  allows  non-cash  management  buy-outs,  for
example  through  banks  foregoing  on the  exercise  of their  own  options  and
choosing  instead  to finance  management  exercising  its (lower  level)  options.
This  is an important  feature;  incumbent  management  is typically  best informed
about  the firm's  potential  but  may be wealth-constrained  and  so unable  to
compete  in  a regular  all-cash  auction.  In fact  non-cash  MBOs have a second
advantage:  they  reintroduce  some  debt in the  new capital  structure  of the
firm.  This is important  as a disciplining  device  on management  in  periods  of
financial  distress  (Dewatripont  and  Tirole  (1992)).
B  A Slmpler  but  Imperfect  Approach:  Consolidate  debts  before  Conversion
A simpler  approach  would  not try  to  preserve  creditor  seniority
structures  but  would instead  seek  to consolidate  as much as  possible  all
claims  into  one of two  classes:  government  claims  and  claims  held by
commercial  banks.  This  would  require  extensive  netting  out  of interenterprise
credits,  transfer  to commercial  banks  of ownership  of claims  on receivables
pledged  as collateral  for  bank loans  extended  by those  banks,  and  buy-outs  of
those  interenterprise  credits  still  left  after  all  this.19
The government  could  then decide  on a rule for  cutting  back its  own
claims;  in Poland  matching  debt reduction  has been  proposed  in such a scheme:
if the  main commercial  creditor  writes  off  say 20%,  the  government  will do
likewise.  Note that  this scheme  is  advantageous  to the  commercial  creditor,
the  equal  cutback  notwithstanding:  a junior  creditor  profits  from  cut  backs  by
senior  creditors  but  the  market  value  of the  senior  creditor's  claims  is not
affected  by anything  the  junior  creditor  does.  A modification  would  offer
larger  cut  backs  for  work  out plans  that  ultimately  lead to  outside  investors
or even incumbent  management  owning  the  shares  rather  than the  commercial
banks  or,  worse,  the  government  itself.
The  ultimate  owner  (the  government  in its  capacity  as shareholder)  then
transfers  its  ownership  claims  either  to foreigners  or domestic  outside
investors  if  cash offers  can  be solicited  after  the  debt  write  downs;  or,  if
no such  offers  are forthcoming,  to  management  and/or  workers  in  what amounts
to  a non-cash  management  buy out. If  more than  one  non-cash  offer  is received,
banks  may  have to submit  the  various  proposals  to outside  experts,  such  as one
of the  many foreign  consulting  firms  now  active  in Eastern  Europe  for  an
unbiased  evaluation.
IV.3  Dealing  with  Large  Entergrises
All these  various  approaches  might  in the  end  still  leave  authorities
with companies  that  nobody  wants,  even  without  any  of the  pre-existing  debt
attached.  If this involves  relatively  small  firms  in not  too  large  a  number,
straight  liquidation  or just closure  is  presumably  possible.  Realism  and often
simple  humanitarian  concerns  suggests  that  such  drastic  actions  may not  work20
for  very  large  enterprises  or  dominant  employers  in  poor  regions.  Here  a  more
gradual  approach  to  closure  is  probably  unavoidable.
In  fact  one  way  of  looking  at  keeping  such  loss  makers  temporarily
afloat  is  as  a sort  of  workfare;  since  the  alternative  is  unemployment,  the
government  could  consider  keeping  the  workers  at  least  productively  engaged.
As  long  as  they  produce  enough  value  added  to  pay  the  excess  of  their  own
wages  over  what  they  would  cost  the  government  in  unemployment  pay,  6/  the
government  comes  out  ahead  from  a  fiscal  point  of  view.
The  argument  against  such  schemes  is  the  same  that  has  been  levied
against  workfare  in  the  US:  by  providing  dead-end  jobs  only,  workers  are  not
really  re-integrated  in  the  economy  and  may  in  fact  be  discouraged  from  trying
to  be,  since  their  income  hinges  on  not  moving  away  from  where  they  currently
are.  The  latter  disincentive  is  of  course  singularly  strong  when  a  whole
region  is  affected,  unfortunately  frequently  the  case  in  Eastern  Europe.
Thus  shielding  large  enterprises  or  regionally  dominant  employers  from
closure  may  be  efficient  compared  to  the  alternative,  but  only  temporarily  so.
But  commercial  banks  may  be  singularly  ill-suited  to  implement  gradual
closure.  If  the  enterprise  is  big  enough  to  effectively  blackmail  the
government  in  not  closing  it  down  now,  there  is  no  reason  to  expect  that  a
commercial  bank  (or  for  that  matter  the  government  itself)  will  be  any  more
successful  later.  Simply  imposing  cash  constraints  is  unlikely  to  be  a
credible  threat;  once  again,  if  the  government  can  be  blackmailed  in  putting
up  the  cash  now,  why  should  the  firm  not  succeed  again  once  the  first
allotment  runs  out?
6  Inclusive  of  the  administrative  costs  of  unemployment  insurance,  which
are  considerablel21
The special  nature  of the  problem  first  of all  suggests  that  management
of these  "workfare  firms"  should  be transferred  to an agency  that is  keenly
aware  of budget  constraints,  such as the  finance  ministry;  and second  that
part of the  winding  down of the  firms  should  be a major  effort  to retrain  the
work force  and assist  it in finding  alternative  employment,  housing  and  so on
so  as  to reduce  incentives  to  block  closure  in ;he  future.  Absent  such  an  job
search  and  retraining  assistance  program,  claims  of support  being  only
temporary  are  simply  not  credible  and  will almost  certainly  be broken.
Even  if the intertemporal  problems  (how  to  make the  temporariness
credible?)  are  solved,  there  are still  incentive  problems  left  in setting  the
total  amount  available  in  any  given  year.  Since  workfare  firms  receive  public
money,  there  are  strong  incentives  to  qualify  for  that status  as a  means to
escape  painful  adjustment  that  other  creditors  might impose.  One  approach
would  be to simpy  Rreselect  the  enterprises,  after  which  this  option  is closed
off.  This is  very  much the  German  approach  to restructuring.
But in  countries  with less  of a civil  service  tradition  (and  lower
government  salaries..),  all the  incentive  problems  highlighted  before  in
discussing  the  government's  role  would  come  up again.  The  political  pressure
and  corruption  incentives  surrounding  the  selection  process  may in  many
countries  argue  for  an approach  where  the  government  has  more of a residual
role.  In such a set  up, other  creditors  would  be required  to attempt  a
restructuring,  along  lines  suggested  above;  the  government  would  then  pick
from the  enterprises  where  this  effort  failed  and liquidation  has  become
unavoidable,  which  ones  would  get  workfare  status.
But it is crucial,  if quantities  are  not regulated,  to stem the22
potential  influx  through  the  price.  Unless  admission  to "workfar status" 7/
is made singularly  unattractive,  the  Fund  will  be oversubscribed  and  other
creditors  will not  be willing  or even  able to strike  prior  restructuring  deals
even  where  that  would  have been  possible  in the  absence  of an intervention
fund.  The  point  is that if senior  creditors  hold out the  possibility  of new
money,  junior  creditors  lose the  incentives  to reduce  their  claims,
particularly  if  new  money is tied  to financing  needs inclusive  of debt
service.
The  solution  is straightforward:  access  to workfare  status  (or  into  the
intervention  fund)  should  be made  conditional  on:
A/ all  junior  creditors  relinquishing  their  claims;
B/ harsh  adjustment  measures  for  both workers  and  managers,  such  as
mandatory  lay-offs,  wage freezes,  and  replacement  of top  management.
Condition  A maintains  the incentive  for  banks to  reach  a restructuring  package
that  will  keep the  enterprise  out  of the  intervention  fund;  and condition  B
maintains  the incentive  for  workers  and  managers  to cooperate  in  this attempt.
If either  one is  not imposed  before  any  money  is  handed  out, the  creation  of
an intervention  fund  will destroy  any  chance  of success  of reaching
restructuring  agreements  through  the  banks  or even  management  buy-outs.
Budgetary  control  over  the  process  will then  become  impossible  to  maintain  and
the  privatization  objective  will be lost.
7  or into  an "intervention  fund"  as it is  called  in Poland  where a
restructuring  approach  along  lines  suggested  here is about  to be tried.23
V  CONMERCIAL  BANK  REGULATION  AND INCENTIVES
One important  caveat  attaches  to  both  proposals  outlined  above:  the
schemes  rely  heavily  on proper  functioning  of the  commercial  banks.  It  cannot
be stressed  enough  that  fast  and substantial  progress  on the implementation  of
effective  mechanisms  of bank supervision  is going  to  be absolutely  essential
for  the  success  of the  scheme. 8 The chaos  among  the  recently  created  private
banks  in Poland  demonstrates  that  point  dramatically.
Proper  functioning  of commercial  banks  in turn  requires  at least  three
things,  each discussed  in turn.
V.1  Regulation
It is difficult  to overestimate  the  importance  of prudential  regulation.
Any business  that  starts  with taking  the  customers'  money  up front  instead  of
after  delivered  services  is  potentially  prone  to fraud.  Such  problems  may
range  from  direct  fraud  (insider  lending)  to excessive  risk taking  by
managers,  especially  if  their  down  side risk  is  partially  covered  by de facto
deposit  insurance.  Experience  in Chile  with unregulated  privatization  clearly
indicates  that  a major  crisis  is the  unavoidable  outcome  of an unregulated
privatized  banking  system.  Thus  privatization  of commercial  banks  should
proceed  cautiously  if at all  as long  as effective  regulatory  mechanisms  are
not in  place.
An effective  regulatory  framework  requires  first  of all implementation
of a loan  classification  and  general  portfolio  assessment  system  to  provide
8  This  point is  also  made  strongly  by Frydman  et alii (1992).24
regulators  with the  necessary  warning  signals.  Such  a reporting  system  needs
to be backed  up by occasional  in depth  on site  audits  to  check  on compliance
and  provide  a more in depth  assessment  than  mechanical  indicators  can  yield.
Such  audits  are also  necessary  to  safeguard  against  fraudulent  practices  such
as lending  to insiders  while  disregarding  normal  standards  of prudence.  The
latter  danger  is  particularly  acute  if  banks  can  be owned  by industrial
groups;  for that  reason  many countries  explicitly  forbid  any industrial
enterprise  to own a  bank.
Second,  rules  and  institutions  need to  be set  up, and  the  people
necessary  to operate  them  recruited  and  trained.  Who  collects  information,
implements  rules,  sets capital  adequacy  guidelines,  rules  in ambiguous  cases
and  so on?  In many  cases  these  tasks  fall  to the  central  bank  which  anyhow  has
to deal  with the  banks  because  of its  conduct  of monetary  policy.
V.2  Enforcement  of Prudential  Regulation
A regulatory  framework  is of little  use if compliance  is not  enforced.
This raises  two  issues.  Fist,  what is the  proper  medium  term  framework  for
enforcement.  Second,  since  both state  owned  and  private  banks  are right  now
far  out  of compliance  with almost  any  reasonable  set  of  prudential  rules,  how
to deal  with the  current  situation?
A  Issues  In the  design  of  enforcement  mechanisms
The main problem  with enforcement  mechanisms  is  how to make it  as
insensitive  as possible  agai.nst  political  intervention  and  direct  attempts  at25
fraudulent  manipulation.  Many  countries  feel that  leaving  enforcement  in  the
hands  of one  institution  leaves  that  institution  too  vulnerable  to such
pressures.  This is especially  the  case if that institution  also is responsible
for  implementing  the  prudential  regulation,  since  that  actually  gives  it the
tools  to circumvent  the  rules  if  pressured  to do so.  Moreover,  supervision
authorities  may  very  well  be tempted  to cover  up past  supervision  failures  in
the  hope that  a reversal  of the  problem  bank's  fortunes  will get  the  bank and
the  supervision  authorities  off the  hook.
Therefore  many countries  vest enforcement  decisions  in  a Banking
Commission  consisting  of the  finance  minister,  the  Governor  of the  Central
Bank and  often  securities  regulators  (in  practice,  in  all  but the  most
important  meetings,  only their  deputies  would  attend).  For  example  in  Mexico
financial  indicators  are  reviewed  monthly  for  all  banks  by the technical  staff
of the  Banking  Commission;  if particular  thresholds  are exceeded,  the
commission  has to take  various  measures;  in the  most serious  cases it  seizes
control  of the  bank  and transfers  it to a restructuring  agency  (which  may but
does  not  have to remove  management).
A banking  commission  usually  establish  supervision  work  programs  and
make enforcement  decisions,  but relies  on Central  Bank  staff  to carry  out
technical  work.There  is little  doubt  that  such  a commission,  on  which several
agencies  are  represented,  is  more  difficult  to manipulate  than  an institution
where  authority  in the  end  rests  with one  person.
B  Recapitalizing  banks
Bank  managers  cannot  be made responsive  to capital  value  of the  bank if26
there  is no capital  to  begin  with.  Thus an essential  element  of  banking  reform
is recapitalization  of the  banks  with enough  income  earning  assets  to leave  a
prudential  capital  base in  place  after  provisioning  for  bad loans.
Recapitalization  through  a  prolo:  ged  pericd  of high spreads  between  lending
and  borrowing  rates  is inefficient;  it takes  too long  and,  more importantly,
works  by taxing  succesful  firms  to fund  the losses  of the  unsuccesful
enterprizes.  This  procedure  could  well abort  private  sector  growth  before  it
even  starts.  An once-off  capital  infusion  based  on public  debt  issue  would
allow  a less  destructive  way of financing  the  resulting  liabilities.
If bank  recapitalization  is  part of an overall  banking  reform-cum-
enterprize-restructuring  plan,  as proposed  in  Poland,  it is  crucial  to  do the
recapitalization  up front,  on an ex ante  basis,  even if it then  has to be
based on an imperfect  assessment  of the true  value  of the  loan  portfolio. 9 If
not, all  incentives  for the  commercial  banks to collect  anything  at all on
their  claims  will  be destroyed:  with recapitalization  ex post,  every  dollar
written  off  will  be replaced  by the  government  with an interest  earning  asset,
so the  banks  have  no incentive  at all to try to  collect  or even to take  equity
stakes.
Objections  to such  a recapitalization  because  of the  funding
requirements  and  associated  fiscal  costs  are  always  misplaced.  The crucial
9  Because  of the  difficulty  of assessing  loan  status,  Begg  and  Portes
(1992)  propose  to simply  remove  all loans  to SOEs  from the  banks'  books.
Because  of the  predominance  of such loans  in bank  portfolios,  this  approach
basically  restores  the  old  communist  practice  of direct  government  lending  to
the industrial  sector,  bypassing  intermediaries.  It would  also vastly
overcapitalise  banks;  e.g.  in Poland  external,  Western  auditors  after  three
consecutive  audits  place  the  percentage  of bad loans  at at most 30% in
aggregate.  Note that  under  the  approach  proposed  here, it  only matters  to get
the  aggregate  loan  quality  roughly  right,  not every  individual  loan;  given  the
incentive  to exaggerate  losses  and the  resulting  conservative  bias in standard
audit  procedures,  that  does  not seem  impossible.27
point is  that  such  a recapitalization  is  nothing  but a recognition  of debts
that  have already  been incurred  in the  past and  thus  requires  no budgetary
allocation  (the  interest  on the  debt instruments  created  of course  does).  The
argument  against  keeping  such debts  off-the-books,  which is  what a failure  to
recapitalize  sufficiently  would  do, is  that  doing  so  unavoidably  leads  to
unpredictable  but highly  inefficient  ways of servicing  the implicit  debt.  In
fact  in  most cases  undercapitalized  banks  end  up being  funded  through  the
inflation  tax  as losses  are  picked  up by the  Central  Bank.  At least  when  the
debts  are recognized  and  their  interest  costs  brought  in the  budget,  an
efficient  tax  structure  can  be set  up to finance  those  costs.
A more interesting  objection  is  raised  by Frydman  et alii (1992).  They
argue  that  any injection  of capital  should  go to  new  banks  rather  than  the  old
ones.  They  propose  to transfer  liabilities  of the  old  banks to offset  the  book
value  of the  bad loans  to  be removed  from their  balance  sheets,  and  use  any
issue  of  new debt  to capitalise  the  new  banks.  They  base this  view on the
claim  that  even  privatization  of the  old  banks  will  not  provide  enough  of an
incentive  to  bank  managers  to change  their  ways.  This  is in the  end a  judgment
issue;  but it is  hard to see  why, if  proper  incentives  are important  enough  to
completely  restructure  the  economy,  it is  nevertheless  reasonable  to assume
that  that  applies  to everybody  except  managers  of existing  banks.  Certainly
the  experience  in  Mexico  with  banking  reform  strongly  supports  the  approach
taken  in this  paper. 10
10  A more important  objection  to Frydman  e.a. (1992),  and  a similar  plan
proposed  in  Coricelli  and  Thorn  (1992),  is that  they  too  transfer
responsibility  for  disciplining  state  enterprises  back to the  Government.  Like
Begg and  Portes  (1992),  they  propose  simple  auctioning  off of those  claims  as
a disciplining  device.  For  reasons  explained  before,  this  is likely  to  be
ineffective  (cf  FN 5).28
V.3  Establish  a Proper  Incentive  Structure  for  Commercial  Banks
Establishing  effective  bank governance  ultimately  requires
privatization.  If quick  privatization  is  not advisable  because  of the absence
of effective  supervision  and  regulation  of private  banks,  a difficult
situation  is created  as was argued  before  in the  discussion  of enterprise
reform.  Any  workable  solution  probably  requires  at least  two  elements.  First,
commercialization  with the  creation  of strong  supervisory  boards  will  be
necessary  so as to allow  close  monitoring  of  management.  Second,  since
monitoring  unavoidably  is going  to  be imperfect,  managers  should  arguably
given  a strong  stake  in eventual  successful  privatization  by providing  them
with the  equivalent  of stock  options:  shares  in the  privatization  receipts  as
part  of their  annual  pay.
VI  EMPLOYMENT  CONSEQUENCES:  WHICH  POLICIES  CAN  HELP?
VI.1  Diaenosis
Labor  market  problems  are the  most  visible  and  politically  most
sensitive  of all transition  problems.  They  are  particularly  costly  in Eastern
Europe  because  of the  absence  of institutions  to provide  a fallback  to those
becoming  unemployed;  at the  same  time,  the  experience  in  Western  Europe  quite
strongly  suggests  that simply  providing  such  institutions  could,  while
lowering  the social  costs  of unemployment,  also  contribute  to its  almost
indefinite  extension.  Western  Europe  is rich  enough  to afford  such inefficient
largesse,  but the East  clearly  is  not. The  core  problem  is to provide  such29
assistance  without  destroying  adjustment  incentives.
A starting  point is the  observation  that  one-off  large  sectoral  shocks
create  different  problems  than  the  regular  fluctuations  associated  with
Western  style  business  cycles.  Western  safety  nets are  designed  to  provide
income  support  during  periods  of temporary  unemployment  after  which  the  worker
is  expected  to go back to the  same  or a similar  job.  They do not  deal at all
with the special  problems  created  by permanent  sectoral  and  regional  shocks,
and  accordingly  have been singularly  unsuccessful  in  dealing  with them.
At the  core of transitional  problems  are informational  problems  and
skill  mismatches.  Workers  losing  their  job in the  textile  industry  in
Massachusetts  might  be willing  to take  up jobs in  electronics  in  California,
but simply  do  not know about  them  and  cannot  afford  the  job search.  Clearly
such  problems  are  greatly  exacerbated  if there  is a regional  aspect  to them.
Regional  unemployment  not only  raises  the  difficulty  of obtaining  adequate
information  about  job opportunities  (and  about  worker  skills  for  potential
employers),  but  also adds the  often  substantial  costs  of relocation  and
housing  provision  if  a job match  is found.
Even  if there  is adequate  provision  of information,  transition  problems
could  still  arise  because  of skill  mismatches.  A lifelong  experience  in
building  tanks  does  not  help  when starting  on the  assembly  of computer
memories.  What this  really  means  is that  built  up human  capital  suddenly  loses
much  of its  value  when patterns  of labor  demand  shift.  The social  costs  may  be
quite  high and  resistance  to the  subsequent  decline  in living  standards  may
threaten  the sustainability  of the  reforms  that  trigger  the  problem.30
VI.2  What Can the  Government  do?
A  Tralning  programs
Successful  adjustment  programs,  like the  one in  Japan  in the  seventies,
put a heavy  emphasis  on training.  Setting  up successful  training  programs  is
fraught  with  problems  however,  as Western  Europe's  experience  indicates.  The
key question  for  mandatory  training  programs  is:  train  people  for  what?  Unless
some  private  sector  involvement  can  be solicited,  placing  trainees  can  become
a serious  problem.
Efforts  to solve  this  problem  through  tax incentives  (subsidizing  firms
that  hire graduates  of training  programs)  have tended  to  produce  only  short
term  relief;  Belgian  experience  with this  approach  is that  trainees  get  fired
once  the tax  benefits  run  out.  An alternative  approach  is tried  in  Mexico,
where  companies  organize  the  training  with government  subsidies  and technical
assistance;  in this  set  up,  jobs are  assured  since  the firm,  which  has to
share  in the  costs  by paying  the  worker  a  wage while  on training,  presumably
would  not  make this  investment  unless  it intends  to reap the  benefits  in the
future.  Paying  workers  while  on training  also  builds  an element  of income
support  into the  program.
Making  firms  share  in the  costs  increases  the  chance  that  the  training
will be properly  directed,  but raises  the  informational  problems  mentioned
before.  After  all, such  cost  sharing  comes  from  new  employers,  not from  the
old, so the  match  between  worker  and firm  still  needs  to  be made.  This is in
particular  a problem  if regional  location  of old and  new firms  are  different.
Plans  in  Mexico  to deal  with this  issue  call for  integration  of data  bases  of31
regional  employment  offices,  and  national  advertizing  of  vacancies  (put  in
practice  mostly  by larger  firms).
Japan  follows  a different  approach  to this issue.  In large  diversified
industrial  groups  the  match  can  be made internally,  and the  companies  own
training  facilities  are typically  used.  The government  itself  has set  up
hundreds  of training  centers  for  use of smaller  and  less  diversified  firms.
Moreover,  contrary  to practice  elsewhere,  Japanese  firms  have to pay  a large
share  of the  wages  of laid  off  workers,  and  therefore  have a strong  incentive
to assist  laid  off  workers  in finding  jobs elsewhere.  It is  not  uncommon  for
firms  to actually  contact  target  firms  and  make arrangements  for  salary
transfers  on condition  that the  new firm  takes  over some  of the  redundant
workers  of the  old  one.
B  Capital  Market  Interventions
Any move into  new industries  or different  lines  of work  by either  firms
or workers  will likely  start  out  with a period  of low  or negative  cash  flows.
This  could  be because  of retraining  expenses  or job search  by workers,  need
for  relocation,  retooling  or investment  outlays  by firms.  This implies  that
access  to credit  is  particularly  important.  Unfortunately,  reorientation  both
means  a decline  in  value  of current  assets  and therefore  diminished
collateralization  possibilities,  and at the  same time  higher  uncertainty  about
future  earnings.  Thus access  to credit  markets  is likely  to  be impaired  at the
very time  it is  most  needed.  This  problem  is  most severe  for individual
workers  or self  employed,  and for  small  and  medium  firms.
For this  reason  successful  restructuring  programs  often  include  a credit32
component  conditional  on submittal  of restructuring  plans.  This  was the  case
in  Australia  after  agriculture  support  prices  were  phased  out in the  seventies
and in the  Japanese  "Smaller  Enterprise  Business  Switchover  Act".  Similar
schemes  are  under  study  in  Mexico  to deal  with potential  labor  market  effects
of the  Free  Trade  Agreement  currently  under  negotiation  with the  US (van
Wijnbergen  (1992)).
C  Public  Investment  Programs  and  Regional  Targeting
There  is now increasing  evidence  of complementarity  between  public
investment  in infrastructure  and  private  investment.  Roads  towards  a village
increase  the  chances  that  somebody  will build  a plant  in that  village.  Thus
private  investment  response  could  well be stronger  if public  investment  in
infrastructure  is to some  extent  shielded  from the  budget  cutting  that  fiscal
sustainability  usually  requires.  Public  sector  investment  projects  geared
towards  private  sector  productivity  improvement  (by  better  roads,  access  to
electricity,  investment  in training  facilities  etc.)  can  play a  very useful
role  in industrial  policy  packages;  during  implementation  labor  is absorbed,
while  a  positive  impact  on private  productivity  means  that  private  demand  for
labor  increases  once the  projects  are finished,  typically  in the  same area.
Key to  Mexico's  relative  ease  of adjustment  (in  terms  of  broad  based
support)  has  been an imaginative  public  works  program  administered  though
local  authorities.  This  program,  by design,  allows  fine  regional  targeting  and
has incentives  built in towards  reducing  bureaucracy  and increasing  local
participation.  The  program,  labeled  PRONASOL,  a Spanish  acronym  for  program
for  national  solidarity,  consists  of block  grants  from the  center  to municipal33
authorities.  They  can use this  money  as they  see  fit  under  the  following
rules.  First,  it  can only  be spent  on  materials;  labor  has to  be provided  for
free  by the  community..  This makes  sure  that  only  projects  the  community
expects  to  profit  from are  chosen;  otherwise  they  would  not donate  their
labor. 11/ Second,  projects  have to  be approved  in open  municipal  meetings,  so
as to eliminate  corruption  and  diversion  of funds  to local  authorities'  own
pockets.
Introduction  of programs  like  this in  Eastern  Europe  would  introduce  an
employment  support  program  that does  not involve  open  ended  budget
commitments,  since  it is  block  grant  based;  it would  self  select  only those
out  of work  by offering  below  market  wages;  it  would  allow  a cheap  way of
building  up infrastructure  and thus is likely  to encourage  matching  private
investment;  and finally  it  allows  regional  targeting,  an important  plus point
given  the  regional  structure  of unemployment  in  most East  European  countries.
A particularly  useful  focal  point  would  be to finance  housing  construction
through  such  a program,  since  this  would  address  one  of the  most serious
barriers  to  mobility  currently  holding  back labor  market  adjustment.
VII  CONCLUSIONS
The  guiding  theme  of this  paper  is that  Eastern  Europe  is  not  well
served  with straight  textbook  advice.  The  common  wisdom  on  privatization  fails
to address  the  problems  created  by the  diffuse  ownership  and  conflicts  over
control  that  exist  prior  to privatization.  Regular  cash  auctions  may fail to
11 Wage payments  below  the  going  rate  would still  preserve  this
"screening  aspect"  to some  extent,  while introducing  an element  of income
support.34
lead  to the  efficient  matching  of managers  and  capital  stock  because  of
pervasive  wealth  constraints.  Standard  advice  on enterprise  restructuring
fails  to incorporate  the  consequences  of the  sheer  scale  of the  problem,  and
of the  special  reasons  why, in Eastern  Europe,  current  profits  are a very  poor
guide  to future  profit  opportunity.  Simply  applying  Western  bankruptcy
procedures  based  on current  data of enterprise  profitability  introduces  a
destructive  bias towards  liquidation  and  delay.  Finally  we argued  that
introduction  of Western  style  unemployment  insurance,  while  lowering  the
social  costs  of  unemployment,  would almost  certainly  also  contribute  to its
indefinite  extension.
We have sketched  how these  problems  can  be addressed  by incorporating
all the  incentive  problems  specific  to Eastern  Europe  into  the  design  of the
policies  to  be implemented.  In  some cases  the  advice  that  comes  out  is novel
and  as  yet untried;  in some  cases  successful  examples  of its implementation
exist.  This  means  that  a  modicum  of imagination  and  experimentation  is
unavoidable.  The alternative,  however,  is  a long  period  of declining  incomes
and,  presumably,  increasing  social  unrest  as the  consensus  underlying  the
reform  programs  starts  to erode.  Thus the  pay off to imaginative  policy  design
and  explicit  attention  to the  political  constraints  and incentive  problems
specific  to the  region  are  difficult  to  overestimate.
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